I think this story will get even better (worse actually)….
3cherriesna777
For those who play the slots, Three Cherries and Three Sevens are a welcome sight.
But maybe it’s a poor combo on landing?
Here’s the bottom line:
Glide Slope Indicators, Auto Throttles, and all that stuff are only aids for the pilot.
The pilot’s job is to have acquired sufficient skill to land the plane without these aids, and most can do it… And of course, the co-pilot is there to assure everything is double checked.
And here we see Pilots and/or their Associations attempt to blame an auto throttle? I have seen it reported in two major media pieces.
The head of the NTSB is being criticized for sharing ‘basic facts’ with the public, can you imagine? I for one enjoy the contrast I see between NTSB and other entities that should have autonomy and should defend it to the death. I’ll let you decide where you see the most contrast, but I suggest you look at other current events.
Let’s have a contest, see if you can make up a good excuse for this landing..
Added note: I’ve decided to add to this post using ‘comments’ scroll down, I think this is worth your while because there is so much of this going on.
GB
Yeah, that’s like blaming the cruise control on an RV for a crash when the driver gets up to make themselves a snack while doing 60-mph !
Excellent Analogy!
It does seem you’ve surmissed correctly on the over dependence on technology to assist the flight crew summed up in a phrase I’ve heard you use prior, K.I.S.S. The captain who landed his plane in the Hudson River made the exact point as you did in his role as a commentator on a major news outlet that especially when duties are carried out by computers NEVER forget to check, recheck & for each of the other officers to verify proper procedure.
What I find amazing Shawn, is most all of us remember that sting! When we’ve missed something that could of cost us our life, or another’s life. The majority of Pilots know how easy it is to miss something.. and it’s why they use check lists, and double check so much.
I told the story about a Doctor who was responsible for putting together pilot selection criteria for WWII pilot training. At the heart of the process was identifying people who found it boring to do the same things over and over again.
What was so interesting about this study was the Questions asked of those who did enter training were reviewed, and those who did best and worst were studied.
Now I know this sounds a little far fetched, but it was the Doctor himself that told the story. There was one question on that screening test… ‘if you answered no’, it was a pretty sure thing you’d never see training. Can you imagine? And that Question was?
“Do you like to chop wood?”
The study found that a significant number of those who did poorly as pilots had answered that question as “no”. Now that could have answered yes, or I don’t know.
Of course, if you are here, you are likely a DIYer, and you’ll immediately associate chopping wood with performing redundant tasks.. .like checking lists over and over and over again?
But we DIYers also know the hearts and minds of the experimenter, we know about hitting your thumb with a hammer, because we were bold enough to swing one. This Doctor, sitting on this pile of data, He’s honed his list of questions, and some were wild shots, do you like to stand on your head during a heavy rain?
Those questionnaires, the very best pilots in training were answering certain questions the same way, and now there were people flying combat missions, and they were being studied as well.
And now we might think about those Tuskegee Airmen. Just how was it they did so well? At least part of the answer might be…that every black person selected scored very high on the questionnaire? Did everyone of them look like the cream of the crop as per the research done by this doctor and his staff? Don’t we know.. if we had all this data, it would be near impossible for us not to want to validate out findings further.
But now we ask.. all this data, all this research, is it all lost, and how well would these Korean pilots score?
Maybe I mentioned that older pilot I had coffee with just the other day. He served on a B36 Bomber flight crew, as we drank coffee, he told me about his flight instructor, a rough around the edges man that would growl like a big cat. He wasn’t there to make friends, and he flunked seven out of the class. If you didn’t perform well under pressure, you were likely going to be flying some desk. The Instructor was fully empowered to do the right thing, and that was to help save lives, those of pilots and the precious cargo they carried.
You know me, it’s just another muse of mine… I am always the student, I’ve got questions, but seldom do I have an answer.
I did come to know this Doctor as I was selected to be one of his guinea pigs, not for pilot selection, but another task. He picked out one question I had given as curious. “All you have answered places you at the top.. but this one is curious he said.”
I remember feeling like I had been nailed to a cross. I had thought long and hard about that question, it was about who I saw as being the most valuable player in a problem solving situation.. “I had lied!”, and now.. I was faced with remaining silent, or explaining I had lied, and inviting him to wonder what else I had lied about? 🙂 Having been identified by others in the study as a most valuable player, I made it over the bar, but that one little fib will serve me for life.. ‘never assume you know the game, especially when you don’t.’
G
So much verbosity you say? well it may be worth it…
If your read my comment above, I attempted to demonstrate that folks that ‘set up the game’ know almost immediately when things are wrong.
We need note, they are the ‘hands on DIYers’, they know the game best, and if you are the new player, you best note, they can likely smell something wrong from a distance away.
It’s unfortunate I don’t have a good copy, you can read most of it. But a warning first, there are Americans quite sure the whole world is the same as their back yard, they see themselves as masters of games they’ve never played before.
It is likely that those of us who have traveled some better understand how difficult it is to turn around corruption, especially a corrupt processes, and technology can make it easier to warp the playing field. I would bet dollars to donuts the following perspective has merit.
It is best we understand that it is not just the Koreans with the problem, so much here is being warped to produce a certain outcome. But I think the end result is the same as flight 214, no one fully understands that people won’t forget the crash.
And when are Unions a good thing? I think Korean Pilots need a Union, and it might be the only thing that would cause me to fly on a Korean Airlines..
Here’s a trainer’s perspective…
>> Pretty long, but interesting perspective. =20
>> =20
>> =20
>> After I retired from XXX as a Standards Captain on the =96400, I got =
a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) =
at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the =
lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a =
normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left =
seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military =
pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much =
faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of =
the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about =
six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be =
identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and =
airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most =
of the people to be very pleasant, it=92s a minefield of a work =
environment … for them and for us expats.
>>=20
>> One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site =
and reported on every training session. I don=92t think this was =
officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator =
periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told =
them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what =
to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 =
knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during =
the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were =
coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution =
System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I =
started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they =
all =93got it=94 and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their =
manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for =
the training program.
>>=20
>> We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal =
accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be =
noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by =
the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink =
their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the =
world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL =
has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we =
had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most =
instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a =
few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training =
centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from =
there.
>>=20
>> This solution has only been partially successful but still faces =
ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of =
highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they =
tried to enforce =93normal=94 standards of performance. By normal =
standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like =
successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the =
weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to =
shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts … with good =
reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt=92 compute that you needed to be =
a 1000=92 AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. =
But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name =
to their training and sometimes if I just couldn=92t pass someone on a =
check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 =
crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an =
extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking =
captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching =
on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to =
renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a =
fly while talking about how unfair Captain XXXXX was.=20
>>=20
>> Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I =
describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc =
from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and =
we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF =
to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he =
requested =93Radar Vectors=94 to final. He could have just said he was =
ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then =
=93Cleared for the approach=94 and he could have selected =93Exit Hold=94 =
and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him =
vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to =
=93Extend the FAF=94 and he couldn=92t understand why it would not =
intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made =
three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his =
active waypoint was =93Hold at XYZ.=94 Every time he punched LNAV, it =
would try to go back to the IAF … just like it was supposed to do. =
Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer =
him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I =
documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron =
on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was =
dictated by KAL).
>>=20
>> This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there =
are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type =
accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are =
already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to =
ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will =
eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a =
Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew =
C-141=92s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got =
hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the =
B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual =
PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got =
involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to =
enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired =
after being arrested and JAILED!
>>=20
>> The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their =
inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of =
training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, =
and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual =
totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many =
times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for =
most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did =
uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational =
system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as =
little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they =
act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and =
in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still =
exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can=92t change =
3000 years of culture.
>>=20
>> The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that =
there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It=92s actually =
illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and =
Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don=92t trust the people to =
not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. =
But, they don=92t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for =
themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from =
college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. =
Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military =
pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator =
flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get =
experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible =
pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!
>>=20
>> Finally, I=92ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours =
they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking =
pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I =
consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far =
between and certainly not the norm.
>>=20
>> Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the =
auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his =
ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight =
hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the =
autopilot to be engaged at 250=92 after takeoff. How much actual flight =
time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the =
autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800=92 after the gear =
was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might =
bring it in to land. Again, how much real =93flight time=94 or real =
experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it=92s the =
same only they get more inflated logbooks.=20
>>=20
>> So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for =
a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it =
raises the hair on the back of my neck.
>=20
a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at =
Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack =
of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal =
situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat =
taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots =
are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. =
Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the =
phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six =
months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be =
identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and =
airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most =
of the people to be very pleasant, it=92s a minefield of a work =
environment … for them and for us expats.
One of the first =
things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on =
every training session. I don=92t think this was officially sanctioned =
by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was =
building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the =
sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For =
example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to =
initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This =
was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or =
B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at =
80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE =
rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all =93got it=94 and =
continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had =
gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training =
program.
We expat instructors were forced upon them after the =
amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a =
decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically =
given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally =
rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the =
skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the =
training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was =
there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and =
about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, =
Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. =
Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did =
hire some instructors from there.
This solution has only been =
partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the =
Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I =
worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce =93normal=94 =
standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being =
able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach =
with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell =
you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their =
hearts … with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt=92 compute =
that you needed to be a 1000=92 AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should =
be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still =
had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn=92t =
pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually =
busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I =
finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was =
the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the =
fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that =
KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another =
check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain XXXXX =
was.
Any of =
you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe =
these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the =
IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just =
administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get =
set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested =
=93Radar Vectors=94 to final. He could have just said he was ready for =
the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then =93Cleared =
for the approach=94 and he could have selected =93Exit Hold=94 and been =
on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to =
final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to =93Extend the =
FAF=94 and he couldn=92t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV =
magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and =
missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was =
=93Hold at XYZ.=94 Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back =
to the IAF … just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I =
was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was =
just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT =
paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a =
30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by =
KAL).
This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am =
surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of =
the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are =
taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats =
to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they =
will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a =
Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew =
C-141=92s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got =
hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the =
B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual =
PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got =
involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to =
enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired =
after being arrested and JAILED!
The Koreans are very very bright =
and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. =
They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled =
briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire =
contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting =
that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind =
landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did =
figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is =
my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE =
memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, =
that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are =
also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight =
training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the =
surface or very subtly. You just can=92t change 3000 years of =
culture.
The other thing that I think plays an important role is =
the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It=92s=
actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. =
Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don=92t trust =
the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into =
North Korea. But, they don=92t get the kids who grew up flying (and =
thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit =
some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them =
their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with =
the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a =
Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light =
airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who =
were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What =
a shock!
Finally, I=92ll get off my box and talk about the total =
flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and =
free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in =
contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few =
and far between and certainly not the norm.
Actually, this is a =
worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take =
one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or =
Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After =
takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be =
engaged at 250=92 after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? =
Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and =
finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800=92 after the gear was down, =
flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in =
to land. Again, how much real =93flight time=94 or real experience did =
he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it=92s the same only they =
get more inflated logbooks
@George… Thank you for the great insight from the behind the scenes training you provided in the far east.
As a 777 driver, I understand that automation has it’s place but leads to weak flying skills. A 16 hour flight is not possible without the highest levels of automation available today. Maintaining heading, speed, and altitude at cruise between top of climb and top of desent is the job of the A/P. Workload permitting, I try to fly by hand as much as possible during all other phases of flight and it actually makes some other pilots uncomfortable (not because of physical movement of the plane) to have to spend extra effort monitoring my hand flying. Airlines and aircraft manufactuers WANT maximum automation for several reasons. The more comfortable the flying public is with automation, the more likely the airlines will be able to continue to reduce the pilots needed to fly a plane with the ultimate goal of replacing them all together. In addition, aircraft manufacturers want to be able to sell their aircraft to countries that do not have strong aviation pipelines and therefore build airplanes that can be operated by the lowest common denominator pilot. If you lower the basic training and experience necessary to operate an airliner, then you can lower the cost of the pilot since larger numbers of people can “qualify” to fly them. It’s simple economics. Airline tickets are the same dollar amounts as they were 30 years ago and pilots are paid the same dollars they were 30 years ago. The only real change is load factors have risen to combat fuel prices rising. The flying public demands the cheapest flying experience possible and then are disappointed when they get it. These types of accidents will continue as pilots around the world get cheaper and cheaper to hire and train. It’s not a real problem though, as far less people are killed in airplane accidents than medical accidents. The airplane accidents are much better news though.
Chris,
First off, that wasn’t me that did the training, it is an account sent to me after I posted about this flight, I think we all need thank him for sharing ..
Human nature.. being what it is, you’d think the pilot would want those ‘hand’ skills just in case Murphy wants to fly with you.
This loss could have bought a lot of training..
I don’t like unions for the most part, but pilots need a union, or maybe I should say we passengers need pilots to have a union.
Thanks for commenting… I’d be pleased as a passenger to ‘feel’ you switch off the AP, and hand it for a bit, and least I’d know someone in the cabin knew how 🙂
There is a lot broken in the world today, and I’m not sure things are getting better.
All the best!
George
I see your source, George, mentioned “CRM” (Crew or cockpit Resource Management) which I believe in time will be shown to be topical if not the ultimate source cited for the problem with the crew trying to bring FLT 214 in w/o the ‘usual’ ILS NAVAID (there are other NAVADs they could have used like a GPS-equivalent but they evidently chose not to use that mode).
Coming in high and fast would be a contributing factor perhaps using “flight level” altitude change mode on the flight nav computer and didn’t de-select and assume manual flying until too late. All this gleaned from delving through a very long thread on PPRUNE (Prof Piliots RUmor and NEws) website the week after the accident.
_Jim
Jim, it will be interesting, to see the final opinions…no excuse for this kind of failure.. or at least I don’t want to fly with a carrier who thinks there is 🙂
Climate Science has been contaminated, Hopefully Aviation can keep the weeds out of the garden.
Thank you so much for your contributions here.
G